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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Frank Antico, Sr. ("Antico") appeals his conviction and 
sentence in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania ("District Court") on one count of 
racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c)--part of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act  
("RICO"),1 nine substantive counts of extortion in violation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1962(c) provides that 
 
                                2 
  
of 18 U.S.C. S 1951 (known as the Hobbs Act), and eight 
substantive counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1343. 
 
On appeal, Antico asserts that he is entitled to a new 
trial for three reasons: (1) the District Court's failure to 
instruct the jury, during its charge on Hobbs Act extortion, 
of the necessity of finding an inducement or a quid pro quo; 
(2) the failure of the Government to prove a scheme to 
defraud the citizens of Philadelphia of their intangible right 
to his honest services; and (3) the insufficiency of the 
District Court's jury instruction on materiality as an 
element of wire fraud. We reject these allegations of error 
and affirm Antico's conviction on Counts One through 
Sixteen of the superseding indictment. 
 
Antico also argues that his conviction of wire fraud on 
Counts Seventeen and Eighteen, which involve his securing 
permits for a prostitution business after he left the City of 
Philadelphia's Department of Licenses and Inspections, 
should be reversed as a result of the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), 
that such a permit does not constitute property within the 
meaning of the wire fraud statute. We agree, and reverse 
Antico's conviction on these counts. 
 
Finally, Antico challenges the District Court's 
enhancement of his sentence for a leadership role in an 
otherwise extensive criminal extortion activity and its loss 
computation on the wire fraud counts. In light of our 
reversal of conviction on two of the wire fraud counts, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with 
       any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate 
       or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, 
       in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of 
       racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
 
In order to find a pattern of racketeering activity, the Government must 
prove that at least two of the sixteen racketeering acts charged were 
connected by a common scheme, plan or motive, and that at least two 
of the racketeering acts were committed within ten years of each other 
(one of which occurred within the five year statute of limitations). 
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for other reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate Antico's 
sentence and remand to the District Court for resentencing. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Antico's indiscretions, which we summarize in this 
section, expose a pervasive abuse of government services. 
In the following recitation of the schemes on which Antico's 
conviction was based, we construe the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Government, as we must following the 
jury's guilty verdict. Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 
80 (1942). 
 
Between 1983 and January, 1996, Antico held various 
positions at the Department of Licenses and Inspections 
("L&I") for the City of Philadelphia (the"City"). L&I's 
function is to administer and enforce the City's code 
requirements, including building, electrical, fire, health, 
housing, business, and zoning regulations. Officials of L&I 
are empowered to issue zoning and use permits and 
licenses according to a first-come-first-served policy, 
conduct inspections, and enforce applicable codes and 
regulations through citations and cease and desist orders. 
Persons aggrieved by these decisions may appeal to the 
Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA"). Antico worked at L&I 
at various times as a Zoning Examiner, a Code 
Administrator, and the Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Director. In these positions, he had the discretionary 
authority to approve zoning and use permits and licenses, 
and to cite and close businesses for violations of the City's 
ordinances and the laws of Pennsylvania, particularly those 
governing adult cabarets and topless bars. The extortion 
and wire fraud schemes that Antico concocted while he was 
a public official at L&I and after he left its employ are 
detailed below. 
 
A. Extortion Schemes -- RICO Acts 1-13, 15, 16 and 
Extortion Counts 2-10 
 
1. Extortion of Westside Check Cashing 
 
On December 22, 1994, L&I closed for zoning violations 
one of Westside Check Cashing's stores, located at 5th and 
Lehigh Avenues in Philadelphia. The controller of the check 
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cashing business met with Antico the next day to discuss 
reopening the business. Antico explained that Westside had 
to file a new application for a zoning and/or use 
registration permit and make other changes. 
 
Several days later, Antico called the controller and the 
owner of the business and told them he wanted a piece of 
jewelry to give to his wife for their anniversary. They 
selected some items, including a diamond pendant 
appraised at $3,275, and sent them to Antico's office by 
courier. The owner and his controller testified that they 
decided to send the jewelry to Antico and not bill him for it 
because of Antico's position with L&I. The zoning issue that 
led to the store closing on December 22 was still pending 
and they were concerned that Antico would use his position 
with L&I to keep the business closed. They understood from 
their conversation with Antico that he did not intend, nor 
did he ever offer, to pay for the jewelry. Once the conditions 
of the permit were satisfied, Antico permitted the store to 
reopen. 
 
2. Extortion of Maureen McCausland2 
 
Maureen McCausland met Antico in 1983 when Antico 
was working in L&I's zoning section. McCausland 
approached Antico to obtain a zoning and/or use permit 
registration for a prostitution business at 2132 Market 
Street in Philadelphia. Her zoning application read"nude 
modeling studio" and Antico advised her instead to call the 
business a "modeling studio" on the application. 
McCausland did so, and she received the license. She later 
paid Antico $500 for getting the permit for her. 
 
This began a pattern of Antico receiving payments from 
McCausland for approval of zoning and/or use registration 
permits for a number of other prostitution businesses she 
opened over the years. She paid Antico $500 when she 
applied for the permit and $500 when she received it. 
McCausland also paid Antico additional sums of money and 
had sex with him so that he would use his position at L&I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Maureen McCausland extortion scheme was charged as a 
racketeering act but not a separate, substantive Hobbs Act extortion 
count. 
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to protect her business. For example, when Antico was 
placed in charge of enforcement, he alerted her to the police 
department's efforts to close her business. McCausland 
estimated that Antico extorted approximately $8,000 from 
her during the period covered by the superseding 
indictment. 
 
McCausland's testimony was corroborated by the 
applications for zoning and use registration permits 
introduced into evidence. These applications were prepared 
by Antico and listed the use as "modeling studio" or 
"physical therapy." 
 
3. Extortion of Adult Cabarets in Philadelphia-- 
       Wizzards, Pin Ups, Tattletales and Teazers 
 
Between 1993 and 1995, Antico served as the Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Director for L&I, supervising the 
unit that enforced compliance with the zoning code. Most 
pertinent to this scheme, Antico was responsible for 
regulating adult cabarets and their compliance with the 
zoning code. 
 
The Philadelphia Code defines an adult cabaret as"[a]n 
adult club, restaurant, theater, hall or similar place which 
features topless dancers, go-go dancers, exotic dancers, 
strippers, male or female impersonators or similar 
entertainers exhibiting specified anatomical areas or 
performing specified sexual activities." Philadelphia Code 
S 14-1605. A business that meets this definition is 
considered a regulated use and is prohibited from operating 
within 1,000 feet of another regulated use or within 500 
feet of a residential area. According to L&I policies, all adult 
cabarets are required to be licensed or to receive a variance 
from the ZBA. In addition, the dancers at a licensed cabaret 
(or a cabaret permitted to operate as such while it sought 
a license) cannot perform in a lewd or obscene manner.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. L&I incorporated the Philadelphia Code definition of obscenity in 
determining what constituted a lewd performance by a dancer. See 
Philadelphia Code SS 10-1100 through -1103. Dancers were thereby 
prohibited from touching patrons and participating in actual or 
simulated sexual acts on stage. Additionally, the dancers were required 
to wear bottoms and latex pasties to cover their breasts. 
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a. Wizzards 
 
The scheme with respect to Antico's extortion of Wizzards 
began with John Messina, John Meehan, and Frank Antico, 
Jr. (Antico's son) forming Pan Enterprises, Inc. to operate 
Wizzards, an adult cabaret located at 38th and Chestnut 
Streets in Philadelphia. Initially, Messina provided the 
start-up money and held 89% of the corporation. Messina 
gave 10% and the manager position to Meehan because of 
his experience in operating topless clubs. Meehan, in turn, 
introduced Messina to Antico, Jr. 
 
Meehan and Antico, Jr. told Messina that if Antico, Jr. 
received a 1% interest in Pan Enterprises and a position as 
a weekend manager, defendant Antico would use his 
position with L&I to help Wizzards operate. Messina agreed 
to this arrangement and to paying Meehan and Antico, Jr. 
part of their weekly salaries in cash without reporting it to 
the taxing authorities. 
 
Antico guided Wizzards through the permitting and 
licensing process at L&I. In addition, when Wizzards 
opened for business on September 23, 1993, Antico 
arranged to have two competing clubs shut down for code 
violations. After Wizzards opened, Antico frequented the 
club and received complimentary drinks, food, and parties 
for himself and his friends. While Antico was present, the 
dancers violated the code restrictions on lewd dancing, yet 
Antico issued neither citations nor cease and desist orders. 
 
After operating Wizzards for a few months, Messina and 
other investors began to quarrel with Meehan and Antico, 
Jr. over the club's management. Although the club was 
crowded and appeared to be doing well, the books did not 
reflect this success. When Messina and the investors tried 
to take a more active role in the club's management, 
Meehan and Antico, Jr. objected and threatened to have 
L&I shut the club down. In fact, in March 1994, Antico 
came into the club and closed it down because the dancers 
were performing in a lewd manner. A former employee of 
Wizzards testified that Meehan told that employee that he 
knew the club would be shut down, but would be permitted 
to reopen the next day. According to this employee, Meehan 
was "flexing his muscles." 
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In June 1994, Eugene Johnson took over Messina's 
ownership interest in Wizzards as repayment of a debt. 
Johnson brought in Dorothy Davis from his New Jersey 
establishment to observe how Meehan and Antico, Jr. 
operated the club. Davis reported that most of the 
employees, including Meehan and Antico, Jr., were getting 
paid cash under the table, that Antico, Jr. was being paid 
a large salary for doing very little, and that the dancers 
were performing in violation of the L&I policies. Johnson 
instructed Davis to put all employees on the books, cut 
Antico, Jr.'s salary or fire him, and require all dancers to 
conform to L&I restrictions on dancing. 
 
When Davis informed Meehan of these instructions, 
Meehan responded that Antico, Jr.'s father was the head of 
L&I and that Wizzards was operating at his mercy. On June 
16, 1994, Meehan and Antico, Jr. resigned their 
employment with Wizzards. Within two hours defendant 
Antico closed Wizzards for lewd dancing. 
 
b. Pin Ups 
 
In August of 1995, Antico, Antico, Jr., and Meehan met 
with the owners of Pin Ups to discuss the sale of the club 
to Antico, Jr. and Meehan. At a follow-up meeting, the 
owners turned down the offer made by Antico, Jr. and 
Meehan. Two weeks later, on September 8, 1995, L&I 
inspectors arrived at Pin Ups, conducted an inspection and 
closed the club for electrical violations. 
 
Prior to the closure, some of the Pin Ups dancers knew 
the club was going to be shut down and arranged to dance 
at Tattletales, another topless club located nearby. The 
owners of Tattletales also knew that Pin Ups was going to 
be shut down and arranged for additional staffing and 
liquor for the night. 
 
On the night of the inspection, one of the owners of Pin 
Ups, suspecting that the closure was in response to their 
refusal to sell the club, told defendant Antico that if Pin 
Ups was not reopened the next day, he was going to"call 
the Feds." Antico permitted Pin Ups to reopen before the 
electrical violations were corrected. 
 
c. Tattletales 
 
Steve Owens and Greg Bertino opened Tattletales in July 
1995. Antico was a regular customer and advised the two 
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on the Code and the obscenity rules. Antico took them to 
other topless clubs to view couch dancing and urged them 
to put a couch dancing room into Tattletales. Antico told 
them to call him if they ever had any problems. 
 
Despite Antico's advice, the dancers at the club did not 
follow the dancing restrictions or the Code. Antico, 
however, did not cite the club for violations. Instead, he 
was treated to free drinks, meals, and couch dances. 
Owens and Bertino did this to gain favor with Antico and to 
maintain good relations with L&I. The two also gave Antico 
$500. 
 
d. Teazers 
 
Thomas Killeen was an owner of Teazers, a topless club 
located at 20th Street and Oregon Avenue in Philadelphia. 
In connection with the opening on September 23, 1993 of 
Wizzards, Antico closed Teazers and another bar owned by 
Killeen because the dancers were violating L&I restrictions. 
 
Subsequent to its reopening, Antico began to patronize 
Teazers. Killeen would socialize with Antico and give him 
free drinks. Antico eventually asked Killeen for, among 
other things, the repeated use of one of Killeen's limousines 
from his limousine company. Killeen acquiesced because of 
Antico's position in L&I and never billed him for the use. 
Killeen ultimately hired limousines from other companies 
because he did not want Antico to be seen in one of his 
vehicles. In addition, Antico asked for, and Killeen let him 
use, six field-level box seats for several Phillies games. 
Antico gave Killeen a list of games he wanted to attend and 
sent an L&I employee to pick up the tickets. 
 
4. Beach Club 
 
Frank Cascerceri was the owner of the Beach Club, a 
nightclub formerly located along the Delaware River in 
Philadelphia. Cascerceri testified that he built a pool at the 
club and hired an expediter4 to apply for permits from L&I. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Expediters are independent contractors who, in exchange for a fee, 
represent individuals and businesses before L&I and the ZBA. Expediters 
typically prepare the paperwork required to obtain permits, licenses, or 
variances by L&I or the ZBA. Expediters may interact with employees of 
L&I during the process, and appear at public hearings before the ZBA. 
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The expediter prepared the necessary application and filed 
it with L&I. Because the club was scheduled to open in the 
Spring of 1993, Cascerceri became frustrated when L&I 
delayed issuing the permit. He called Antico and explained 
the urgency of getting the permit. Antico told him that he 
was using the wrong expediter, and that he should hire 
Elizabeth Ricciardi5 to expedite his application for the 
permit. Antico spoke to Ricciardi before Cascerceri did and 
urged her to take the employment. 
 
To avoid the risk of not getting L&I approval, Cascerceri 
hired Ricciardi. He paid her $625 for her assistance, 
although Ricciardi testified that she did very little to obtain 
the permit. Shortly after he hired Ricciardi, Cascerceri 
received his approval from L&I. 
 
5. Extortion of Barbara Williams6 
 
Barbara Williams worked as an expediter in Philadelphia 
from 1984 to 1989. To circumvent L&I's first-come-first- 
served rule of processing applications, Williams would turn 
to Antico on her urgent matters and pay him to process her 
paperwork ahead of others. She also paid Antico to prepare 
particularly complex zoning applications. Typically, 
Williams would give Antico batches of permits to process at 
one time, and paid him according to the number of 
applications he processed. The payments ranged from $30 
to $75 per application. Williams estimated that Antico 
extorted approximately $5,000 from her during her work as 
an expediter. 
 
B. Mail and Wire Fraud Scheme Involving Elizabeth 
       Ricciardi -- RICO Acts 14A-F and Wire Fraud Counts 
       11-16 
 
Antico's employment with L&I required him to refrain 
from using his position to secure advantages for himself or 
his family members. The Philadelphia Code provides that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Ricciardi is the subject of the mail and wire fraud racketeering acts 
and the substantive wire fraud offenses in Counts 11-16. See the 
discussion of the Ricciardi mail and wire fraud schemes, infra at part 
I.B. 
 
6. The Barbara Williams extortion scheme was charged as a racketeering 
act but not a separate Hobbs Act extortion count. 
 
                                10 
  
city employees must disclose publicly a conflict of interest 
and recuse themselves from taking any official action in a 
matter where they have a financial interest.7 In addition, 
state ethics laws prohibited him from using his employment 
for private pecuniary gain.8  See 65 Pa. C.S.A. SS 401-409, 
repealed by P.L. 729, No. 93, S 6(a)(2) (Oct. 15, 1998), and 
replaced with 65 Pa. C.S.A. SS 1101.1-1108. These code 
provisions are implicated by Antico's arrangement with 
Elizabeth Ricciardi. 
 
In the late 1980s, Ricciardi had two children by Antico. 
Initally, Antico failed to make child support payments, 
forcing Ricciardi to file a child support petition in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 20-607 of the Philadelphia Code, titled Conflict of Interest, 
states in relevant part: 
 
       Unless there is public disclosure and disqualification . . . , no 
City 
       officer or employee shall be financially interested in any 
legislation, 
       including ordinances and resolutions, award, contract, lease, case, 
       claim, decision, decree or judgment made by him in his official 
       capacity . . ., nor shall any financial interest be held by a 
parent, 
       spouse, child, brother, sister or like relative-in-law, or by any 
       person, firm, partnership, corporation, business association, 
trustee 
       or straw party for his or her benefit. 
 
8. The State Ethics Act provides that "[n]o public official or public 
employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest." 
65 Pa. C.S.A. S 403. The Ethics Act defined a conflict of interest as 
follows: 
 
       Use by a public official or public employee of the authority of his 
       office or employment or any confidential information received 
       through his holding public office or employment for the private 
       pecuniary benefit of himself, a member of his immediate family or a 
       business with which he or a member of his immediate family is 
       associated. "Conflict" or "conflict of interest" does not include 
an 
       action having a de minimis economic impact or which affects to the 
       same degree a class consisting of the general public or a subclass 
       consisting of an industry, occupation or other group which includes 
       the public official or public employee, a member of his immediate 
       family or a business with which he or a member of his immediate 
       family is associated. 
 
65 Pa. C.S.A. S 402. The statute currently in effect is virtually 
identical 
to the provision cited above. See 65 Pa. C.S.A. S 1102. 
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9. The Philadelphia Sign Company, located in New Jersey, was one of 
Ricciardi's clients. Telephone calls from Ricciardi in Philadelphia to the 
client in New Jersey on six separate occasions in December of 1993 
serve as the basis for the substantive wire fraud offenses in Counts 
Eleven through Sixteen. The use of the mails with respect to the same 
client constituted the mail fraud racketeering acts proven as predicate 
acts under the RICO Count. 
Division. The child support order at that time was $60 per 
week. Antico volunteered to pay child support if Ricciardi 
would withdraw the petition, which she agreed to do. He 
made three payments, then stopped. 
 
In lieu of the payments, Antico offered to establish 
Ricciardi as an expediter. She was reluctant to accept, 
knowing nothing about the expediting business, but Antico 
told her that he would take care of everything. This was not 
an empty promise. Antico referred clients to Ricciardi who 
needed licenses and permits from L&I. Ricciardi would call 
Antico when a client hired her. Antico would then tell 
Ricciardi how to fill out the applications or would complete 
them himself. Ricciardi was known to use Antico's office at 
L&I to do her work, and he would have city employees pick 
up and deliver her paperwork and watch her children. 
Antico personally worked on 564 of the 748 building 
permit, and 288 of the 322 zoning permit, applications filed 
by Ricciardi and submitted them under her name. 9 
Moreover, Antico was the one who approved the permits 
and applications submitted by her business. Antico neither 
publicly disclosed a conflict of interest nor disqualified 
himself from taking official action in these matters, as 
required by Section 20-607 of the Philadelphia Code. As a 
result of this arrangement, Ricciardi admits to earning over 
$700,000 during the course of the arrangement. 
 
In 1993, upon discovering that Antico was signing permit 
applications on behalf of Ricciardi, L&I Commissioner Levin 
transferred Antico and moved the responsibility for permit 
approvals to a different manager. Antico was no longer the 
head of the zoning department, and his job responsibilities 
no longer included approving permit applications. 
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C. Wire Fraud Scheme Involving Maureen McCausland 
       Counts Seventeen and Eighteen10 
 
In January 1996, Antico left L&I and established an 
expediting business in Philadelphia under the name Frank 
P. Antico, Zoning Consultant, Advisor, and Technician of 
the Philadelphia Code. In 1997, Maureen McCausland 
requested Antico's services to reopen a prostitution 
business. Unbeknown to Antico, McCausland was 
cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 
at the time and this request was part of a Government 
operation. Antico assisted McCausland with her permit 
application, which declared the facility to be a modeling 
studio/physical fitness business at 1212 Walnut Street, 
Philadelphia.11 Antico attempted to hide his involvement by 
having another expediter submit the applications. 
 
* * * * * 
 
On September 30, 1998, a federal grand jury in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an eighteen count 
superseding indictment. The Government charged Antico 
with sixteen racketeering acts under the umbrella of one 
RICO count (Count One), nine of which were also charged 
as substantive Hobbs Act extortion counts (Counts Two 
through Ten), and six of which were charged as substantive 
wire fraud counts (Counts Eleven through Sixteen). Antico 
was charged with two additional substantive wire fraud 
counts (Counts Seventeen and Eighteen) that do not fall 
under the RICO umbrella count. The jury convicted Antico 
of all eighteen counts in the superseding indictment. With 
respect to the RICO count, the jury concluded that fifteen 
of the sixteen predicate racketeering acts were proven.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Maureen McCausland wire fraud scheme charged in Counts 
Seventeen and Eighteen is not part of the RICO Count. 
11. The two communicated via interstate phone calls to set up meetings 
to discuss the application and how to circumvent the L&I regulations. 
These conversations were taped by the FBI. 
12. The jury concluded that Racketeering Act 2 was not proven. This act, 
which occurred in March 1993, was the exchange of $500 for obtaining 
the zoning and/or use registration permit that falsely declared that 
McCausland operated a "modeling studio" at 2132 Market Street. 
However, this is not fatal to the conviction on the RICO count because 
the jury concluded that Racketeering Acts 3 through 6, which pertained 
to the same extortion scheme involving McCausland, as well as 
Racketeering Acts 7 through 16, were proven. 
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On April 28, 2000, Antico was sentenced to terms of 
sixty-three months imprisonment on Counts One through 
Ten (RICO and extortion) and to terms of sixty months 
imprisonment on Counts Eleven through Eighteen (wire 
fraud). All terms were to be served concurrently. 13 In 
addition, Antico was sentenced to three years supervised 
release, ordered to pay a fine of $10,000 and a special 
assessment of $1,000, and ordered to forfeit $52,900. 
 
II. Legal Discussion 
 
This Court has jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment 
of conviction and sentencing pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
On appeal, Antico alleges three points of trial error and 
challenges his sentence on two grounds. We address each 
allegation of error in turn. 
 
A. Requirement of Inducement or Quid Pro Quo  in Hobbs 
       Act Extortion 
 
Antico challenges the District Court's instructions to the 
jury with respect to Hobbs Act extortion under "color of 
official right." The Hobbs Act provides in relevant part: 
 
       (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or 
       affects commerce or the movement of any article or 
       commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or 
       attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens 
       physical violence to any person or property in 
       furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in 
       violation of this section shall be fined not more than 
       $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
       both. 
 
       (b) As used in this section-- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (2) The term `extortion' means the obtaining of 
       property from another, with his consent, induced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The District Court grouped for sentencing purposes the RICO and 
extortion counts in one group and the wire fraud counts in a second 
group. It then imposed a sentence based on the groups rather than on 
the individual counts. 
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       by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, 
       violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1951 (emphasis added). Thus, the statute 
supports two classes of extortion: extortion induced by 
"wrongful use of force" and extortion "under color of official 
right."14 The latter is at issue in this case. 
 
Specifically, Antico argues that the District Court should 
have charged the jury to determine whether he induced his 
extortion victims into giving him gifts and favors with a 
promise or threat of an official act in return or, at a 
minimum, that a quid pro quo was reached between them. 
This Court exercises plenary review over the alleged failure 
of the District Court to charge the jury properly on a matter 
of law. United States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
1. Inducement 
 
With respect to Antico's claim that an inducement 
instruction should have been charged to the jury as per 
subsection (b)(2) of the Hobbs Act, the Supreme Court in 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), clearly 
rejected inducement as an element of the offense of 
extortion "under color of official right." Id. at 256. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that 
 
       the requirement of inducement is automatically 
       satisfied by the power connected with the public office. 
       Therefore, once the defendant has shown that a public 
       official has accepted money in return for a requested 
       exercise of official power, no additional inducement 
       need be shown. The coercive nature of the official office 
       provides all the inducement necessary. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) (ruling 
Hobbs Act covers actions by public officials under color of official right 
even when the payment is not obtained by force, threats nor use of 
force); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1982) 
("The public officer's misuse of his office supplies the necessary element 
of coercion, and the wrongful use of official power need not be 
accompanied by actual or threatened force, violence or fear."). 
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United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 796-97 (11th Cir. 
1990). Relying on the common law of extortion, the 
Supreme Court agreed and held that "the word`induced' is 
a part of the definition of the offense by the private 
individual, but not the offense by the public official. . . . 
The statute merely requires of the public official that he 
obtain `property from another, with his consent, . . . under 
color of official right.' " Evans, 504 U.S. at 265. Thus, 
Antico's claim that an inducement instruction should have 
been given fails. 
 
2. Quid Pro Quo 
 
Antico also asserts that the District Court should have 
charged the jury to find a specific quid pro quo . He cites to 
a trilogy of Supreme Court cases -- McCormick v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), Evans v. United States, 504 
U.S. 255, and United States v. Sun Diamond Growers of 
Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999) -- in support of his argument. 
 
Antico begins by citing to the cornerstone Supreme Court 
case on Hobbs Act extortion--McCormick, which held that 
an explicit quid pro quo is necessary for conviction under 
the Hobbs Act when a public official receives a campaign 
contribution. In McCormick, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the District Court erred by instructing the jury that such a 
quid pro quo was not necessary. McCormick  500 U.S. at 274.15 
 
The logic the Supreme Court employed in McCormick 
follows the fine line between what is legal campaign activity 
and the "forbidden zone of conduct." 
 
       [T]o hold that legislators commit the federal crime of 
       extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents 
       or support legislation furthering the interests of some 
       of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign 
       contributions are solicited and received from those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The District Court's instructions in McCormick did not omit passively 
a quid pro quo element, as the District Court did in the case before us. 
Instead, the District Court affirmatively stated that "it is not necessary 
that the government prove that the defendant committed or promised to 
commit a quid pro quo, that is, consideration in the nature of an official 
action in return for the payment of the money not lawfully owed." Id. at 
261 n.4 (emphasis added). 
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       beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what 
       Congress could have meant by making it a crime to 
       obtain property from another, with his consent,"under 
       color of official right." To hold otherwise would open to 
       prosecution not only conduct that has long been 
       thought to be well within the law but also conduct that 
       in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election 
       campaigns are financed by private contributions or 
       expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of 
       the Nation. It would require statutory language more 
       explicit than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a 
       contrary conclusion. 
 
Id. at 272-73. 
 
Because the line is so subtle, the Supreme Court ruled in 
McCormick that an overt quid pro quo is a necessary proof 
in the context of campaign contributions. 
 
       The receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable 
       under the Act as having been taken under color of 
       official right, but only if the payments are made in 
       return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the 
       official to perform or not to perform an official act. In 
       such situations the official asserts that his official 
       conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise 
       or undertaking. This is the receipt of money by an 
       elected official under color of official right within the 
       meaning of the Hobbs Act. 
 
Id. at 273. 
 
Antico appears to favor extending the McCormick  explicit 
quid pro quo ruling to non-elected public employees outside 
the context of campaign contributions because the state of 
mind necessary to convict in the two contexts is the same. 
However, the Supreme Court noted that its holding was 
limited to campaign contributions. 
 
       McCormick does not challenge any rulings of the 
       courts below with respect to the application of the 
       Hobbs Act to payments made to nonelected officials or 
       to payments made to elected officials that are properly 
       determined not to be campaign contributions. Hence, 
       we do not consider how the "under color of official 
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       right" phrase is to be interpreted and applied in those 
       contexts. 
 
Id. at 268-69. In light of this express limitation, we decline 
Antico's invitation to extend McCormick to apply to his 
situation. The quid pro quo can be implicit, that is, a 
conviction can occur if the Government shows that Antico 
accepted payments or other consideration with the implied 
understanding that he would perform or not perform an act 
in his official capacity "under color of official right." 
 
In Evans, decided one year after McCormick, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a jury instruction containing an implicit, 
as opposed to an explicit, quid pro quo requirement in the 
context of campaign contributions passed muster under 
McCormick. The Supreme Court stated: 
 
       We reject petitioner's criticism of the instruction, and 
       conclude that it satisfies the quid pro quo requirement 
       of McCormick v. United States, because the offense is 
       completed at the time when the public official receives 
       a payment in return for his agreement to perform 
       specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is 
       not an element of the offense. . . . We hold today that 
       the Government need only show that a public official 
       has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, 
       knowing that the payment was made in return for 
       official acts. 
 
Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. In other words, no"official act" 
(i.e., no "quo") need be proved to convict under the Hobbs 
Act. Nonetheless, the official must know that the payment 
-- the "quid"-- was made in return for official acts. 
 
Outside the campaign contribution context, where 
Antico's case falls, the line between legal and illegal 
acceptance of money is not so nuanced. The Hobbs Act 
simply states that use of one's office to obtain money or 
services not due is extortion: "the Government need only 
show that a public official has obtained a payment to which 
he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in 
return for official acts." Id. Antico would read into the 
phrase "knowing the payment was made in return for 
official acts" a requirement that the jury be instructed 
using the express words "quid pro quo." 
 
                                18 
  
We echo the Supreme Court's satisfaction with an 
implicit quid pro quo requirement. In United States v. 
Bradley, 173 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), we considered the 
question of whether, in a non-campaign contribution Hobbs 
Act extortion case, an express agreement must be shown. 
Relying on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Evans, we 
agreed that " `the official and the payor need not state the 
quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect 
could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.' " Bradley, 
173 F.3d at 231 (citing Evans, 504 U.S. at 274). 
 
In addition, we rejected Antico's argument when we 
affirmed, in part, the District Court's holding in United 
States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994), affirming in 
part and dismissing on other grounds, 827 F. Supp. 1153 
(E.D. Pa. 1993).  Analyzing both the McCormick  and Evans 
cases, the District Court in McDade concluded that "[g]iven 
the language of the Supreme Court's opinion, I find that 
McCormick does not require a quid pro quo  for extortion 
outside the context of campaign contributions." 827 F. 
Supp. at 1171; accord United States v. Davis,  967 F.2d 516 
(11th Cir. 1992). "[S]ince I can find no language in the 
Opinion of the Court in Evans which explicitly extends the 
quid pro quo requirement, and since the facts of Evans did 
not require the Court to extend McCormick, I respectfully do 
not interpret the Court's opinion so broadly as did those 
concurring and dissenting Justices [in Evans ]." McDade, 
827 F. Supp. at 1171 n.8. We reiterate our agreement with 
McDade. 
 
The relevant inquiry is whether the District Court's 
instruction satisfied the implicit quid pro quo  requirement 
where non-campaign contribution Hobbs Act "color of 
official right" extortion is charged. A closer look at Evans' 
language on quid pro quo, as well as Bradley and McDade 
and the District Court's decision, all of which dealt with 
"color of official right" Hobbs Act extortion outside the 
campaign contribution context, lead to the conclusion that 
the District Court did not err in its jury charge. The proper 
instruction, as per the Evans Court, is"that the 
Government need only show that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing 
that the payment was made in return for official acts." 504 
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U.S. at 268. The jury instruction we affirmed in Bradley 
reads as follows: 
 
       So if a public official agrees explicitly or implicitly to 
       take or withhold some action for the purpose of 
       obtaining money for someone else, that constitutes 
       extortion. The public official need not fulfill the promise 
       of the payor to do or not to do an official act, although 
       the official's failure to influence may be considered 
       along with all of his conduct in determining whether or 
       not he possessed the intent to commit the crime. The 
       crime is completed at the time when the public official 
       knowingly accepts the benefit in return for his 
       agreement to perform or not to perform an act related 
       to his office. Moreover, the government does not have to 
       prove that there was an express promise on the part of 
       the public official to perform a particular act at the time 
       of the payment. 
 
       In sum then, it is sufficient if the public official 
       understands that he is expected, as a result of the 
       payment, to exercise particular kinds of influence or to 
       do certain things connected with his office as specific 
       opportunities arise. 
 
Bradley, 173 F.3d at 231 (emphasis added). 
 
The District Court's charge to the jury in Antico's case, 
after specifically reading the relevant portions of the Hobbs 
Act, was as follows: 
 
       Extortion under color of official right is the use of one's 
       position as a public official or the authority of public 
       office to obtain money or services not due the official or 
       his public office. Such extortion violates the Hobbs Act. 
 
       . . . 
 
       If you decide that the defendant was given money or 
       goods or services not due the office he represents, you 
       must then decide whether the defendant used the 
       authority of his office or position to obtain the money, 
       goods or services. The third element is wrongful 
       obtained consent of the giver. The Government must 
       prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these items were 
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       given to the defendant in connection with his power and 
       authority as a public official. 
 
       The giver may have initiated the exchange and the 
       parties may be on friendly terms. These are factors to 
       be considered in deciding whether the giver gave the 
       payments, goods or services because he believed the 
       defendant would use his office for acts not properly 
       related to his official duty or whether instead the giver 
       was making a voluntary contribution. 
 
       Unless you decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
       defendant knew the giver's consent was wrongfully 
       obtained, that is, that the money, goods or services were 
       given in connection with the defendant's misuse of his 
       official position rather than being given voluntarily, you 
       cannot convict the defendant. 
 
(Emphases added). 
 
No specific instruction to find an express quid pro quo 
was given. Nor did the District Court specifically negate 
such a requirement as the trial court did in McCormick. As 
the District Court noted, "I didn't not grant the 
Government's points, by the way, . . . which asked me to 
charge that no quid pro quo was required and no 
inducement was required. I just didn't charge it." Antico 
argues that a jury instruction failing to mention quid pro 
quo falls short of the mark. 
 
We disagree with Antico's interpretation of the Supreme 
Court's intent. Considering the District Court's instructions 
as a whole, and the highlighted phrases in particular, 
which require a finding of Antico's knowledge of a 
"connection" between the payment and the misuse of his 
office, we find that they sufficiently convey the implicit quid 
pro quo approved in Evans and Bradley. As a result, the 
District Court did not err in its charge to the jury. If Antico 
knew that payments or other consideration were extended 
to him to secure unwarranted favorable treatment in his 
official capacity, he is guilty of Hobbs Act extortion under 
color of official right without the need to prove that the 
official action (or inaction) occurred. 
 
Lastly, Antico cites to the recent case of United States v. 
Sun Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999), as an 
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affirmation that the Supreme Court has retreated from its 
holding in Evans and returned to the position in McCormick 
that an express quid pro quo must be found. Notably, 
however, the Sun Diamond case was brought under the 
federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. S 201(b)(2), not the 
Hobbs Act. The crime of illegal gratuity "requires a showing 
that something of value was given, offered, or promised to 
a public official (as to the giver), or demanded, sought, 
received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by 
a public official (as to the recipient), for or because of any 
official act performed or to be performed by such public 
official." Id. at 404. The Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he 
insistence upon an `official act,' carefully defined, seems 
pregnant with the requirement that some particular official 
act be identified and proved." Id. at 406. 
 
As a result, the Court held in Sun Diamond that, "in 
order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(1)(A), the 
Government must prove a link between a thing of value 
conferred upon a public official and a specific`official act' 
for or because of which it was given." Id.  at 414. Again, 
noting the subtle distinction between what is legal 
campaign activity and the "forbidden zone of conduct," the 
Supreme Court recognized the peculiar results if it were to 
convict without a finding of any connection between the 
public official's intent and a specific official act. "It would 
criminalize, for example, token gifts to the President based 
on his official position and not linked to any identifiable act 
-- such as the replica jerseys given by championship sports 
teams each year during ceremonial White House visits." Id. 
at 406-07. Thus, in the context of campaign contributions 
under the illegal gratuity statute, Sun Diamond  requires 
proof of a specific "quo," which Antico argues necessitates 
an express quid pro quo jury instruction. 
 
In contrast to the illegal gratuity statute, the Hobbs Act, 
as interpreted by both the Supreme Court and our Court, 
contains no express quid pro quo requirement in the non- 
campaign contribution context. The concerns over illegal 
campaign contributions addressed by the gratuity statute 
and the Hobbs Act -- solved by an express quid pro quo 
requirement in those cases -- do not automatically carry 
over to the line of cases dealing with Hobbs Act extortion as 
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it pertains to non-elected officials. Accordingly, we do not 
read Sun Diamond to require a heightened quid pro quo jury 
instruction, distinct from that outlined in Evans, in this 
case. Because the District Court's jury instruction comports 
with that in Evans and Bradley, we reject Antico's 
allegation of error in this respect. 
 
B. Intangible Rights of Honest Services 
 
1. Sufficiency of the Government's Proof 
 
The jury found that the Government had proven all of the 
mail and wire fraud racketeering acts under the RICO 
count and found Antico guilty of all of the substantive 
counts of mail and wire fraud. On appeal, Antico challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the 
fraudulent schemes. Again, sufficiency of the evidence is 
reviewed in a light most favorable to the Government 
following a jury verdict in its favor. Glasser v. United States, 
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). "We must sustain the verdict if 
there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, to uphold the jury's decision. 
. . . We do not weigh evidence or determine the credibility 
of witnesses in making this determination." United States v. 
Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted). The scope of review is over the totality of the 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial. United States v. 
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1073 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 
In relevant part, the mail and wire fraud statutes provide: 
 
       Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
       scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
       property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
       representations, or promises . . . [uses the mails or 
       wires, or causes their use] for the purpose of executing 
       such scheme or artifice . . . shall be fined under this 
       title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. SS 1341 & 1343. To prove mail or wire fraud, the 
evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the 
defendant's knowing and willful participation in a scheme 
or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, 
and (3) the use of the mails or interstate wire 
communications in furtherance of the scheme. United 
 
                                23 
  
States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Identical standards apply to the "scheme to defraud" under 
both the mail and the wire fraud statutes. United States v. 
Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 586 n.11 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 
Courts have interpreted the term " `scheme or artifice to 
defraud' [to] include a scheme or artifice to deprive another 
of the intangible right of honest services," United States v. 
Woodward, 149 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing United States 
v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723-24 (1st Cir. 1996)), giving rise 
to the "intangible rights doctrine."16 This doctrine reaches 
public and private fraud at the state and local levels, 
including prosecutions of public officials or employees who 
have failed to provide honest services to the citizenry they 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The intangible rights doctrine gradually developed as courts of 
appeals interpreted the mail fraud statute since its origin in the late 
1800s. In 1987, the Supreme Court overturned decades of mail and wire 
fraud jurisprudence in McNally v. United States , 483 U.S. 350 (1987), 
when it held that the mail and wire fraud statutes do not prohibit 
schemes to defraud individuals of their intangible right to honest 
government services. In response, Congress enacted the honest services 
amendment the next year. It provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 
the term `scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. 
S 1346 (effective Nov. 11, 1988). Section 1346 was enacted without much 
comment and little legislative history. However, commentary and judicial 
reflection indicate that the statute was enacted to overturn McNally and 
restore the evolution of mail and wire fraud to its pre-McNally status. 
See 134 Cong. Rec. H11,251 (daily ed. Oct 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers) ("This amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where 
that provision was before the McNally decision."); Id. at S17,376 (daily 
ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("This section overturns the 
decision in McNally v. United States. . . . Under the amendment, those 
statutes will protect any person's intangible right to the honest services 
of another, including the right of the public to the honest services of 
public officials."); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 20 (2000) 
(noting "Congress amended the law specifically to cover one of the 
`intangible rights' that lower courts had protected under S 1341 prior to 
McNally: `the intangible right of honest services' "); United States v. 
DeVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that " `Congress 
passed [S 1346] to overrule McNally  and reinstate prior law' ") 
(alteration 
in original); United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 556 (1st Cir. 
1996) (same, citing cases). 
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serve.17 Although our interpretation of the scope of the mail 
and wire fraud statutes is not boundless, we have 
construed a "scheme or artifice to defraud" to encompass 
intangible rights. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1149-53 (affirming 
the conviction of a county political party chairman who 
defrauded nursing home residents of their absentee ballots 
and marked them in favor of the party's candidate); United 
States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1983) 
("Schemes to defraud come within the scope of the statute 
even absent a false representation."); United States v. Boffa, 
688 F.2d 919, 931 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that a scheme 
to defraud employees "of the loyal, faithful, and honest 
services of their union official alleges a crime within the 
scope of the mail fraud statute"). Given Congress' clear 
intent in enacting S 1346, we join with those courts that 
recognize that the scope of the amendment includes the 
prosecution of state and local officials and public employees 
for depriving the citizens they serve of their right to honest 
services.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See, e.g., Woodward, 139 F.3d 46 (affirming the conviction for mail 
and wire fraud on the "theft of honest services" theory where legislator, 
serving on the Joint Committee on Insurance, accepted illegal gratuities 
from insurance industry lobbyist); United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 
(1st Cir. 1987) (applying the mail fraud statute to local political 
corruption and affirming the conviction of a Boston city official who 
secretly arranged for a friend to receive commissions from the city's 
choice of health insurance provider); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 
108, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the conviction of the chairman of 
a local Republican committee who fraudulently arranged for his 
associates to receive insurance contracts with local governments); see 
also Daniel W. Hurson, Mail Fraud, The Intangible Rights Doctrine, and 
the Infusion of State Law: A Bermuda Triangle of Sorts, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 
297, 305 & n.34 (2001) (citing cases). 
18. Antico argues that extension of the mail fraud statute to local 
political corruption runs counter to the heightened federalism concerns 
recently raised by the Supreme Court. See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 25 ("As 
we reiterated last Term, `unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it 
will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state 
balance' in the prosecution of crimes."). However, Antico's argument is 
misplaced. While the Supreme Court recently voiced federalism concerns 
over the reach of mail fraud prosecutions in general in Cleveland, it 
acknowledged that Congress indeed spoke clearly when it restored the 
"intangible right of honest services" within the scope of S 1346. Id. at 
20. 
Moreover, we need not reconcile the principles of federalism with S 1346 
in this case because Antico owed a duty to the citizens of Philadelphia 
under state and local law. See Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 124. 
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The Government's prosecutorial theory on this point is 
that Antico, by failing to disclose his personal interest in a 
matter over which he had discretionary decision-making 
authority, deprived the public of its right to disinterested 
decision-making and of its right to full disclosure of his 
potential motivation. The scheme to defraud involved 
Antico's setting Ricciardi up as an expediter, then preparing 
and approving her permits. Ricciardi received a fee for her 
"services" which, in turn, substituted for Antico's obligation 
to pay child support. The Government contends that the 
requisite intent to defraud was met, in light of this scheme, 
by Antico's failure to disclose the nature of his personal 
interest in Ricciardi's business and to recuse himself from 
reviewing approvals submitted by her. Finally, the 
Government contends, and Antico does not dispute on 
appeal, that interstate phone calls and mailings were made 
in furtherance of the scheme. 
 
Antico argues that while "discharge of debt" of a family 
member may pose a conflict of interest, his "nepotistic 
gifting" to his girlfriend does not rise to an actionable 
deprivation of his honest services under the mail or wire 
fraud statutes. He denies that he had a financial interest in 
Ricciardi's business at the time alleged in the indictment 
because his debt, if any, had mathematically been 
discharged at the time of the indictment. With respect to 
his intent to defraud, Antico argues that he never actively 
concealed from his colleagues at L&I either that he had 
children with Ricciardi or that he set her up in the 
expediting business. Thus a requisite element of fraud is 
missing. We address each of these contentions in turn. 
 
Honest services fraud typically occurs in two scenarios: 
(1) bribery, where a legislator was paid for a particular 
decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a conflict of 
interest resulting in personal gain. Woodward , 149 F.3d at 
54-55. This duty to disclose a conflict of interest arises in 
the private sector from the fiduciary relationship between 
an employer and an employee. In the public sector, the 
duty is oftentimes prescribed by state and local ethics laws. 
In the latter context, 
 
       [a] public official has an affirmative duty to disclose 
       material information to the public employer. See 
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       Silvano, 812 F.2d at 759. When an official fails to 
       disclose a personal interest in a matter over which she 
       has decision-making power, the public is deprived of 
       its right either to disinterested decision making itself 
       or, as the case may be, to full disclosure as to the 
       official's potential motivation behind an official act. See 
       id. (upholding conviction of city fiduciary who failed to 
       disclose material information about unnecessary 
       spending of city money for secret enrichment of 
       fiduciary's friend). Thus, undisclosed, biased decision 
       making for personal gain, whether or not tangible loss 
       to the public is shown, constitutes a deprivation of 
       honest services. 
 
Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724. 
 
We agree with the Government that Antico's duty to 
disclose material information with respect to his conflict of 
interest with Ricciardi arose from state and local law. 
Antico disagrees, arguing that the state and local conflict of 
interest laws that governed his conduct while at L&I 
contained a loophole for "girlfriends." 65 Pa. C.S.A. S 402 
(". . . for the private pecuniary benefit of himself, a member 
of his immediate family or a business with which he or a 
member of his immediate family is associated"); Philadelphia 
Code S 20-607 ("nor shall any financial interest be held by 
a parent, spouse, child, brother, sister or like relative-in- 
law, or by any person, firm, partnership, corporation, 
business association, trustee or straw party for his or her 
benefit") (emphases added). We read the emphasized 
portions of these statutes to include Antico's scheme with 
Ricciardi. The expediting scheme with Ricciardi, while 
certainly benefitting her (and at least indirectly the two 
children she had with Antico), also provided a tangible 
benefit to Antico: it fulfilled his ongoing child support 
obligation and served as consideration in exchange for 
Ricciardi's forgoing court proceedings against him. 19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Antico's mathematical contention that his child support obligation 
disappeared after Ricciardi had earned roughly $32,000 (based on the 
court-ordered payment in the 1980s) ignores the ongoing and dynamic 
nature of his obligation, as well as the fact that he also purchased 
Ricciardi's agreement not to pursue court sanctions against him as long 
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Therefore, Antico owed the City a duty to disclose this 
financial arrangement, the failure of which constitutes 
honest services fraud. 
 
Antico correctly notes that "the broad scope of the mail 
fraud statute . . . does not encompass every instance of 
official misconduct that results in the official's personal 
gain." Czubinski, 106 F.3d at 1076 (citing Sawyer, 85 F.3d 
at 725) (reversing conviction of IRS employee on mail fraud 
charges for unauthorized browsing of taxpayer files absent 
a showing of impartial performance of public servant's 
duties); United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 
1987) ("We do agree that the words `scheme or artifice to 
defraud' don't reach everything that might strike a court as 
unethical conduct or sharp dealing"). However, even if we 
were to read these conflict of interest provisions as 
restrictively as Antico suggests, we find that his conduct 
violated the fiduciary relationship between a public servant 
charged with disinterested decision-making and the public 
he serves. Id. at 307 ("Fraud in its elementary common law 
sense of deceit -- and this is one of the meanings that 
fraud bears in the [mail fraud] statute . . .-- includes the 
deliberate concealment of material information in a setting 
of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward 
the public . . . ." ). Duties to disclose material information 
affecting an official's impartial decision-making and to 
recuse himself exist within this fiduciary relationship 
regardless of a state or local law codifying a conflict of 
interest. Id. at 309; Silvano, 812 F.2d at 759-60. Antico's 
exercise of his discretionary authority in both filling out 
and approving the applications submitted by Ricciardi 
without disclosing his interest in the scheme goes beyond 
the mere ministerial function excused in Czubinski and into 
the realm of interested decision-making. When coupled with 
the duty imposed by state and local conflict of interest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
as she cared for his children. Moreover, as we state later in this 
discussion, even if we were to disregard the child support arrangement, 
Antico's conduct in filling out the applications and then personally 
approving them for the financial benefit of Ricciardi deprives the public 
of the disinterested decision-making of one of its public servants, a 
breach of Antico's fiduciary duty to the citizens of Philadelphia. 
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laws, Antico's failures to disclose his financial business 
arrangement with Ricciardi and to recuse himself from 
taking action with respect to her applications fall within the 
scope of honest services fraud. 
 
Antico also contends that "absent deceit, concealment, 
demonstrable public harm or other active fraud," his 
conviction for wire fraud cannot stand. We disagree. In the 
context of honest services fraud, where "undisclosed, biased 
decisionmaking for personal gain, whether or not tangible 
loss to the public is shown, constitutes a deprivation of 
honest services," Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724, an active fraud or 
deceit is not necessary. 
 
       [T]he courts that have accepted the notion that a 
       deprivation of intangible rights is within the statute[ ] 
       recognize that an active misrepresentation is not 
       necessary. Instead, the prosecution need prove only a 
       recognizable scheme formed with intent to defraud 
       regardless of how that intent manifests itself in 
       execution. For example, a public official engaged in 
       bribery by mail need not actively make any 
       misrepresentations in order to violate section 1341. 
 
Frankel, 721 F.2d at 920-21. "The legal meaning of `fraud' 
is not limited to deceit or misrepresentation; it includes 
overreaching, undue influence, and other forms of 
misconduct." Holzer, 816 F.2d at 309. Nor is a showing of 
public harm required. Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724 (". . . 
whether or not tangible loss to the public is shown"); 
Holzer, 816 F.2d at 308 ("It is irrelevant that . . . [Holzer's] 
conduct caused no demonstrable loss either to a litigant or 
to the public at large."); Silvano, 812 F.2d at 760 ("It is 
immaterial whether [the defendant] personally profited from 
the scheme or whether the City suffered a financial loss 
from it.") (citing United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 
1205 (8th Cir. 1982)); United States v. Mandel , 591 F.2d 
1347, 1358 (4th Cir. 1979) (approving the prosecution of 
allegedly corrupt politicians who did not deprive the citizens 
of anything of economic value); United States v. Keane, 522 
F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (same). 
 
In this case, Antico's failure to disclose his financial 
interest in the success of Ricciardi's expediting business 
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and his failure to recuse himself from approving the permit 
applications he filled out constitute "deceit" for purposes of 
the mail fraud statute. "[A]n official's intentional violation of 
the duty to disclose provides the requisite `deceit'." Sawyer, 
85 F.3d at 732 (citing Silvano, 812 F.2d at 760). The fact 
that Antico did not conceal his relationship with Ricciardi 
from his co-workers does not vindicate his failure to 
disclose to his supervisors the conflict arising from their 
financial arrangement nor his failure to recuse himself from 
acting on the permit applications she submitted. 
 
It also does not preclude a jury from finding Antico 
possessed the requisite intent to defraud the citizens of 
Philadelphia. Woodward, 149 F.3d at 62 ("Woodward's 
intent is . . . demonstrated by his failure to disclose his 
conflict of interest although he was required to do so."). The 
fact that Antico never reported any conflict of interest to his 
superiors while at L&I, despite his knowledge of the state 
and local conflict of interest laws, supports the jury's 
finding of intent to deceive necessary for a wire fraud 
conviction. In fact, Antico continued the fraudulent scheme 
even after L&I Commissioner Levin specifically instructed 
him in 1993 to have no involvement in approving Ricciardi's 
permit applications. Despite Levin's instructions, Antico 
urged Ricciardi to submit permits on behalf of the 
Philadelphia Sign Company, which he approved. Antico also 
prepared the permit application for Wizzards at this time on 
Ricciardi's behalf and prepared the appeal before the ZBA, 
signing Ricciardi's name. Finally, Antico told the owner of 
the Beach Club to use Ricciardi as his expediter, 
affirmatively promoting this scheme despite the warning of 
the conflict of interest. 
 
In sum, when we view this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Government, we find that it has met its 
burden of proof. There was clearly sufficient legal support 
and factual evidence, both direct and circumstantial, on 
which a reasonable jury could rely to reach its verdicts. 
 
2. Materiality Instruction 
 
According to Antico, the District Court erred by omitting 
"materiality" from its jury instruction on the mail fraud 
racketeering acts. He relies on the Supreme Court's 
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declaration in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), 
that "materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal 
mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes." Id. at 25. 
This Court considers the totality of the jury instructions to 
determine "whether, viewed in light of the evidence, the 
charge as a whole fairly and adequately submits the issues 
in the case to the jury." United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 
214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999). Because Antico did not object to 
the District Court's treatment of materiality, we only review 
it for plain error. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
465-67 (1997). Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court." Fed. R. Crim P. 
52(b). The Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725 (1993), articulated the limitations on appellate 
review under Rule 52(b): "The first limitation on appellate 
authority under Rule 52(b) is that there indeed be an 
`error.' " Id. at 732. The second is that the error be "plain" 
and the third is that the error "affect substantial rights." Id. 
at 734. Even if these requirements are met, the court 
should not exercise its discretion unless the error"seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings." Id. at 736. 
 
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Neder , Antico 
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because, after the 
District Court instructed the jury on materiality with 
respect to the wire fraud counts and racketeering acts 
(Counts Eleven through Eighteen), it did not re-instruct the 
jury on materiality with respect to the mail fraud 
racketeering acts (Racketeering Acts 14A-D). In addition, 
Antico submits that the District Court should have 
specifically instructed the jury that materiality must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The question is whether 
this failure to re-instruct the jury on materiality when 
giving the mail fraud instruction constitutes plain error. 
 
The District Court's instructions were carefully crafted 
and lengthy, spanning over 100 pages. With respect to the 
wire fraud counts, the Court began by defining a scheme to 
defraud in the context of wire fraud. It explained that the 
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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there was a "scheme or artifice to defraud," and defined a 
scheme to defraud as "any plan, device or course of action 
to obtain money or property or the intangible right of 
honest services by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations or promises reasonably calculated to 
deceive persons of average prudence." In describing "false 
and fraudulent representations," the District Court stated: 
"The false or fraudulent representation or failure to 
disclose[ ] must relate to a material fact or matter. A 
material fact is one which would reasonably be expected to 
be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying 
upon the representation or statement in making a 
decision." Clearly the wire fraud instruction was adequate.20 
However, when discussing the racketeering acts of mail 
fraud under the RICO count, the Court did not instruct on 
false representations and materiality. 
 
Preliminarily, we find Antico's case to be unlike United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), where the Court 
entirely failed to present the issue of materiality to the jury. 
In this case, both the wire fraud and the mail fraud 
offenses derived from the same scheme between Antico and 
Ricciardi. The material information that was not disclosed 
by Antico was the same in both counts. Therefore, a 
reasonable jury, instructed to consider materiality with 
respect to this scheme, would logically do so in the context 
of both wire fraud and mail fraud. See United States v. 
Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding 
that where only one fraudulent scheme was at issue with 
respect to both mail fraud and false statement charges, the 
court's instruction to the jury that materiality was an 
element of the mail fraud charge ensured that the jury 
would have found this element existed with respect to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Antico takes issue with the wire fraud jury charge to say that 
"materiality" should have been instructed"beyond a reasonable doubt" in 
the same sentence. Because the District Court defined materiality as an 
element of the scheme to defraud, and explained that the scheme needed 
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we conclude that the jury 
charge was sufficient in this respect. He also questions whether 
materiality should be subject to a "reasonable person" test in the 
circumstances. Neder instructs us that the reasonable person test is not 
error. 527 U.S. at 22. 
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false statement charge had the jury been properly 
instructed). 
 
The District Court's instructions clearly informed the jury 
that, by definition, "a false or fraudulent representation or 
failure to disclose[ ] must relate to a material fact or 
matter." By convicting Antico of wire fraud, the jury found 
that Antico's failure to disclose was material, and"it is 
beyond doubt that the members of the jury would have 
reached the same conclusion had they explicitly considered 
materiality as part of their deliberations" on the mail fraud 
racketeering acts stemming from the same conduct. 
Winstead, 74 F.3d at 1321. Therefore, the District Court's 
jury instructions on materiality were not erroneous. 
 
C. Scheme to Defraud Philadelphia of Property -- 
McCausland's Zoning Permits 
 
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. 
United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), the Government agrees 
that Counts Seventeen and Eighteen should be remanded 
to the District Court for entry of judgments of acquittal. In 
Cleveland, the Court reversed a mail fraud conviction of a 
defendant who obtained a video poker license from the 
state by making false representations on his license 
application. The Court held that an unissued video poker 
license was not property within the meaning of the mail 
fraud statute. Id. at 15. 
 
Counts Seventeen and Eighteen charged that 
 
       while Antico was working as a private expediter 
       following his retirement from L&I, he obtained a 
       zoning and/or use registration permit for Maureen 
       McCausland's putative prostitution business. He 
       obtained that permit by falsely stating on the permit 
       application that McCausland was going to operate a 
       "modeling studio/physical fitness business" in 
       Philadelphia. 
 
The prosecution of Antico on these two counts was 
premised on a zoning permit being property within the 
meaning of S 1343. Appellee's Supp. Br. at 2. Because the 
Supreme Court's ruling negates the Government's premise, 
we reverse Antico's conviction on these counts. 
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D. Sentencing Challenges 
 
Antico alleges that the District Court erred by (1) 
enhancing his offense level by four levels because it 
determined he was an organizer or leader of criminal 
activity that involved five or more participants or was 
otherwise extensive, and (2) inflating the loss attributable to 
the Ricciardi scheme to defraud to over $700,000, the 
amount earned by Ricciardi in her expediting business. We 
review for clear error a District Court's factual 
determinations underlying the application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 242-43 
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Ortiz , 878 F.2d 125, 
126-27 (3d Cir. 1989)). Our review of the District Court's 
legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. 
United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Once these tests are satisfied, we owe deference to the 
District Court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines to 
those facts, as required by 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e). Helbling, 
209 F.3d at 243. 
 
The District Court grouped Antico's convictions for 
purpose of sentencing, placing the extortion activity in one 
group, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2(c)(1.1) 
(1999), and the mail and wire fraud activity in a second 
group, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2(c)(1.7). It 
then calculated the offense levels for each group. The 
extortion group led to an offense level of twenty-four and a 
sentence of sixty-three months, while the fraud group led to 
an offense level of twenty and a sentence of sixty months 
(to run concurrently). The District Court used the adjusted 
offense level of the highest group, extortion, to determine 
the sentencing range. Therefore, the ultimate sentence 
imposed by the District Court, sixty-three months, was not 
based on the amount of loss caused by the fraud activities. 
Antico's objection to his leading role adjustment pertains to 
the first group of extortion activities whereas his objection 
to the loss calculation pertains to the second group of fraud 
activities. The Government contends that the District 
Court's use of the extortion group to determine Antico's 
ultimate sentence renders Antico's objection to the loss 
calculation moot. 
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1. Organizer or Leader of a Criminal Activity of Five or 
       More Participants or Otherwise Extensive Criminal 
       Activity 
 
We review for clear error the District Court's factual 
determinations that Antico was an organizer or leader and 
that his criminal activity involved five or more participants. 
Helbling, 209 F.3d at 242-43.In simple term s, we will 
vacate "only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." United States v. Dent, 149 
F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 1998). With respect to the extortion 
offenses, the District Court adjusted Antico's base offense 
level upward four levels for his aggravating role. Under 
S 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a District Court 
adjusts the offense level based on defendant's role as 
follows: 
 
       S 3B1.1. AGGRAVATING ROLE 
 
       Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase 
       the offense level as follows: 
 
       (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a 
       criminal activity that involved five or more participants 
       or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.1."Participant" is 
defined as one "who is criminally responsible for the 
commission of the offense, but need not have been 
convicted." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ManualS 3B1.1, 
cmt. n.1. Application note 3 adds gloss to what the District 
Court should consider when determining the defendant's 
role: 
 
       In assessing whether an organization is "otherwise 
       extensive," all persons involved during the course of 
       the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud 
       that involved only three participants but used the 
       unknowing services of many outsiders could be 
       considered extensive. 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.1, cmt. n.3. 
 
We agree with the District Court's conclusion that Antico 
was an organizer or leader of criminal activity. Application 
note 3 to S 3B1.1 identifies relevant factors in this 
determination: 
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       Factors the court should consider include the exercise 
       of decision making authority, the nature of the 
       participation in the commission of the offense, the 
       recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a 
       larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of 
       participation in planning or organizing the offense, the 
       nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree 
       of control and authority exercised over others. 
 
Id. With respect to Meehan and Antico, Jr., the evidence 
supports the conclusion that he played a decision-making 
role in their activities with respect to extorting Wizzards 
and Pin Ups. Antico also supervised the Business 
Regulatory Unit at L&I, the unit charged with enforcing the 
adult cabaret ordinances. When Wizzards, Pin Ups and 
Teazers were shut down, Antico made the decisions and 
issued the orders. The District Court's findings in this 
regard are not clearly erroneous. 
 
Under the "five or more participants" prong ofS 3B1.1, 
the District Court counted the defendant and the 
unindicted co-conspirators of Antico, Jr. and Meehan 
because of their involvement in the scheme to extort 
Wizzards and PinUps of a financial interest in the 
businesses. The District Court also counted Maureen 
McCausland and Barbara Williams because of their 
extortion payments to Antico to benefit their prostitution 
business and expediting business, respectively. The District 
Court also considered "at least some of the other victims 
and all of the unknowing persons at the Department of 
Licenses and Inspections . . . in determining whether there 
were five or more participants." Alternatively, under the 
"otherwise extensive" prong of S 3B1.1, the District Court 
ruled that "there were the functional equivalent of five 
participants by reason of the use of . . . L and I personnel" 
(citing to Helbling, 209 F.3d at 248 ("[T]he court must 
determine the extent to which the services of each 
individual, non-participant, were peculiar and necessary to 
the criminal scheme . . . [and] then consider whether the 
sum of the participants and countable non-participants is 
the `functional equivalent' of five participants.")).21 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The District Court apparently imported the"functional equivalency" 
test from the "otherwise extensive" prong into the "five or more 
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We take issue with the District Court's inclusion of 
Maureen McCausland and Barbara Williams, victims of 
Antico's extortion schemes, in the mix of five participants. 
Extortion victims, whether they operate legitimate or 
illegitimate businesses, are still victims. As this case 
demonstrates, owners of illegitimate businesses such as 
Maureen McCausland may be particularly vulnerable to an 
L&I official's abuse of power, but they are no more 
criminally responsible for the offense of extortion than 
legitimate business owners. The same holds true for 
expediters. The fact that their legitimate role in filling out 
and hastening permit applications to L&I was corrupted by 
Antico does not make them criminally responsible for being 
extorted by him. In this respect, the District Court's 
inclusion of both Maureen McCausland and Barbara 
Williams within the definition of participant is clearly 
erroneous. By its definition, only Antico, Meehan, and 
Antico, Jr. may be counted. 
 
Alternatively, the District Court ruled that Antico's 
criminal activity met the "otherwise extensive" prong of 
S 3B1.1, justifying a four level increase. With respect to 
what constitutes "otherwise extensive," we caution that "not 
every individual tangentially involved in the criminal 
activity can fairly be considered in the analysis. The 
purpose of the provision would rarely be achieved by 
counting the unknowing services of some actors in a 
criminal scenario, a taxicab driver or bank teller, for 
instance." Helbling, 209 F.3d at 247 (citation omitted). To 
guard against such a broad brush, we adopted in Helbling 
the three-step test from United States v. Carrozzella, 105 
F.3d 796 (2d. Cir. 1997), to help determine whether the 
criminal activity is "otherwise extensive." 
 
       A sentencing court must first separate out the 
       "participants" as defined by Application Note 1 from 
       other individuals, non-participants, who were involved 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
participants" determination by counting all of the unknowing persons at 
L&I. We note that the "five or more participants," by definition, must 
somehow be responsible criminally for the offense. Therefore, the 
unknowing L&I officials are more appropriately considered in the 
"otherwise extensive" determination. 
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       in the criminal activity. . . . The defendant may be 
       considered as one of the participants. The court must 
       next determine whether the defendant used each non- 
       participants' services with specific criminal intent. 
       Third, the court must determine the extent to which 
       the services of each individual, non-participant, were 
       peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme. 
 
Helbling, 209 F.3d at 247-48 (citations omitted). 
 
We add to this rule another consideration. The language 
of S 3B1.1 requires the court to consider the defendant's 
leadership role with respect to the particular offense 
charged. Although "all persons involved during the course 
of the entire offense are to be considered," this does not 
sanction a court taking the activities of non-participants 
from unrelated schemes and grouping them together to 
reach the "functional equivalent" of five persons. The 
actions or services of non-participants must all relate to the 
common criminal activity or scheme -- and to the offense 
charged. A sentencing court should take particular care in 
situations where like offenses have been grouped together 
for sentencing purposes, as was done in this case. 
Counting Maureen McCausland and Barbara Williams 
among the "functional equivalent" of five participants was 
clearly erroneous for this reason as well. 
 
In light of our ruling that victims may not be considered 
as participants, it is unclear from the record whether the 
District Court properly completed the "otherwise extensive" 
analysis. Assuming that Antico, Meehan, and Antico, Jr., 
were participants, the District Court next needed to 
determine whether Antico used each non-participant L&I 
officials' services with specific criminal intent and as part of 
a single criminal scheme. The District Court did not make 
explicit findings in this regard. Citing step three from 
Helbling, the District Court found that the services of those 
L&I officials mentioned in the Government's submissions -- 
Thomas Simmonds, Gary Adams, Steve Gibbs, Michael 
Shaughnessy, Dominic Verde, and Gerald Richards-- who 
were used by Antico to shut down Wizzards and Pin Ups, 
met the "peculiar and necessary" test. However, based on 
the record before us, we cannot say that the District Court 
undertook the proper legal and factual analysis when it 
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made its "functional equivalency" determination. We 
therefore vacate the sentence on the extortion charges and 
remand for re-sentencing in accordance with Helbling and 
this opinion. 
 
2. Loss Calculation 
 
Antico also challenges the District Court's loss 
calculation on the mail and wire fraud offenses. In 
sentencing Antico on this group of offenses, the District 
Court employed S 2(c)(1.7)(b)(1)(A) of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which reads: 
 
       (b) Specific Offense Characteristic 
 
       (1) (If more than one applies, use the greater): 
 
       (A) If the loss to the government, or the value of 
       anything obtained or to be obtained by a public 
       official or others acting with a public official, 
       whichever is greater, exceeded $2,000, increase by 
       the corresponding number of levels from the table 
       in S 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit). 
 
The Commentary to S 2F1.1 defines loss as"the value of the 
money, property, or services unlawfully taken." U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2F1.1, cmt. n.7. The loss 
calculation need not be precise; the Sentencing Guidelines 
require only a "reasonable estimate" based on the 
information available. Id. at n.8. Generally, a defendant's 
gain may provide a reasonable approximation of a victim's 
loss and may be used when more precise means of 
measuring loss are unavailable in determining the sentence 
dealing with offenses involving fraud or deceit. Id.; see 
United States v. Anderson, 45 F.3d 217 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 
The District Court used the amount of $770,284 to 
adjust the offense level from ten to twenty in accordance 
with the table in S 2F1.1. The question presented on appeal 
is whether the District Court's loss calculation, based on 
the entire gain to another "acting with the public official" in 
honest services fraud, is clearly erroneous. The victim in 
this case, the citizenry of Philadelphia, lost something 
intangible: the honest services of one of its public officers. 
How should this loss be valued? Antico objects to 
calculating the loss from the gross receipts to Ricciardi in 
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her expediting business. Instead, he argues that the loss 
should be at most the estimated $31,200 child support 
obligation that was the motivation behind his scheme to 
defraud, or arguably zero in light of our decisions in United 
States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1996), and United 
States v. Hayes, 242 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2001), that actual 
loss or actual harm, as opposed to defendant's gain, was 
the appropriate basis for measuring the loss. 
 
In Maurello, this Court considered "whether money paid 
by clients for apparently satisfactory legal services 
performed by an unlicensed attorney is considered part of 
the `loss' from the attorney's fraudulent acts for purposes of 
S 2F1.1." 76 F.3d at 1308. "To the extent that the 
unauthorized services provided by defendant have not 
harmed their recipients, but to the contrary have benefitted 
them, we conclude that defendant's base offense level 
should not be enhanced." Id. at 1312. While not an exact 
fit, Maurello seems to reject the notion that what Ricciardi's 
clients paid her for her services, with which they were 
satisfied, is the appropriate measure of loss. 
 
Antico also cites to United States v. Hayes, wherein we 
approved the Maurello approach to loss calculation. The 
issue in Hayes was "whether the total salary paid to Hayes 
in all of her fraudulently obtained employment should have 
been assessed as the amount of loss . . . or whether, under 
the rule of Maurello [citation omitted], the court should 
have attempted to determine whether any of the services 
performed by defendant had value." Hayes, 242 F.3d at 
115. We held that Maurello controlled and vacated and 
remanded for resentencing "[b]ecause, had the District 
Court applied Maurello, it might have fixed a lower offense 
level resulting in a lesser sentence than the year and a day 
sentence imposed." Id. 
 
Antico argues that the District Court should have applied 
the Maurello/Hayes logic in this case. Inasmuch as none of 
Ricciardi's clients were harmed, he insists the loss should 
be zero and no enhancement be applied. We reject Antico's 
reliance on Maurello and Hayes, which did not decide the 
issue of loss from honest services fraud, in favor of the 
clear outcome mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines in 
this case. "If the loss to the government, or the value of 
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anything obtained or to be obtained by a public official or 
others acting with a public official, whichever is greater, 
exceeded $2,000, increase by the corresponding number of 
levels from the table in S 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit)." U. S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2(c)(1.7)(b)(1)(A). The 
amount Ricciardi received -- by "acting with the public 
official" -- is the correct measure of loss under this section. 
Therefore, the District Court's calculation of the loss at 
$770,284 was not clearly erroneous.22 
 
In summary, we vacate the sentence imposed by the 
District Court in this case and remand for three reasons. 
First, the District Court needs to determine whether our 
reversal of conviction on Counts Seventeen and Eighteen 
has any effect on its decision to sentence within the 
sentencing range on the fraud grouping of offenses. Second, 
we vacate and remand for the District Court to conduct the 
necessary inquiry with respect to Antico's aggravating role 
in the extortion scheme, as set forth in United States v. 
Helbling, 209 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000), and this opinion. 
Finally, the District Court must reconsider its decision to 
sentence Antico based on the extortion grouping of offenses 
after recalculating the sentence for each of the wire fraud 
group and the extortion group in accordance with this 
opinion. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Accordingly, we affirm Antico's convictions on Count One 
(RICO),23 Counts Two through Ten (extortion), and Counts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The Government contends that we need not reach the question 
because the ultimate sentence was based on the higher offense level 
generated by the extortion grouping, and did not rest on the lesser 
offense level under the fraud grouping. Thus, even if the District Court 
calculated the loss as something less, the ultimate sentence of 63 
months would have been imposed anyway based on the higher extortion 
sentence. We have addressed the fraud loss calculation because our 
remand to the District Court for reconsideration of Antico's sentence in 
light of our reversal on Counts 17 and 18 (wire fraud) and our ruling on 
Antico's aggravating role in the extortion scheme may affect the grouping 
chosen by the District Court in its ultimate sentence. 
 
23. Antico's conviction on the RICO Count is unaffected by our reversal 
of Counts 17 and 18 because the McCausland wire fraud scheme was 
not charged as predicate racketeering acts. 
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Eleven through Sixteen (wire fraud). We reverse the 
conviction on Counts Seventeen and Eighteen (wire fraud). 
Finally, we vacate Antico's sentence and remand to the 
District Court for resentencing in accordance with this 
opinion. 
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